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INTRODUCTION
Hydroelectric power in Alaska has had a curious history--and an
instructive one. This study focuses on three separate projects:
Eklutna, Rampart, and Devil Canyon. The Eklutna project functions
today; Rampart was not constructed; and the Devil Canyon project is
still in the planning stage. Yet for all their differences in location,
goals, and fate, the projects were related; and, taken together, their
histories highlight all the essential political elements involved in
hydroelectric power construction. There is still a fourth project which
is functioning today--the Snettisham installation near Juneau which is
not considered in this paper.
A complex decision-making process determines the progress of such
large projects. In following these three Alaskan projects, we can gain
a better perspective on the roles of the several government agencies and
the public; thus we can assess some of the inherent complexities. Such
an assessment fully substantiates the conclusion that it takes more than
moving dirt to build a dam.
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EKLUTNA
In a historic sequence, the Eklutna power project deserves first
consideration over Rampart and Devil Canyon. But, in this report,
Eklutna's history has been placed in the appendix because its devel-
opment varied so dramatically from that of the more recent projects. It
is not that Eklutna is not important--after all, it is producing today,
while Rampart and Devil Canyon exist only as dreams--but that its story
reflects another era. In retrospect, we can see that the Eklutna project
was developed with remarkable speed and ease, although its proponents
chafed at delays at the time. There was nothing of the arousal of
public opinion and competing forces over Eklutna as existed with Rampart
and Devil Canyon. Thus it is better to include Eklutna's story as a
reminder of other conditions, rather than as an introduction to very
different events which have not yet been settled.
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RAMPART DAM
In 1959 Congress appropriated money for an initial Corps of Engineers'
study of the feasibility of Rampart Dam. Subsequently more money was
made available and, over the next few years, the Rampart project occasioned
a controversy whose size matched that of the proposed facility. The
controversy exposed the problems associated with the construction of
such vast public power projects; it revealed the concerns of opposing
interested agencies and opinion groups; and, above all, it highlighted
the time lag affecting such projects.
It is not the purpose of this study to show that Rampart was
either a sound scheme, unfortunately aborted, or a foolish one, justly
suspended. We wish, rather, to show the complexity of public response,
and the relationship of the Rampart project to the planning of Devil
Canyon.
The investigation of the feasibility of a hydroelectric facility at
Rampart Canyon on the Yukon River originated with a resolution of the
Senate Public Works Committee dated April 24, 1959. This memorandum
requested that the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors of the
U. S. Army Corps of Engineers investigate and report on the project. A
small sum, $49,000, was appropriated for the study.
Rampart Canyon, a narrow portion of the Yukon River near the town
of Rampart about 100 miles northwest of Fairbanks, offered impressive
possibilities for hydroelectric development. The corps's study indicated
that the site could hold the largest dam in the world, one which would
be backed by a reservoir larger than Lake Erie produced by the flooding
of 10,000 square miles. Such a project's, electrical power output would
be commensurate with its physical proportions: five million kilowatts
of power could be generated each year, fully two and one-half times as
much as Grand Coulee Dam and twice that of any other dam in existence.
These awesome statistics had been gathered prior to Congress's resolu-
tion of April 1959, so it was clear that the scope of the potential
development was generally understood.
Sponsors of Rampart in the U. S. Senate predicted that the economic
benefits of Rampart would be very great. At that time Alaska was not
yet officially represented in the Senate and Rampart's proponents included
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Richard L. Neuberger, an Oregon Democrat who had an abiding interest in
Alaskan matters. As the corps prepared to investigate Rampart, Neuberger
told Oregonians and others in September 1959 that Rampart was one
example of a means by which the new state of Alaska could contribute to
Pacific Northwestern prosperity. "Rampart dam on the Yukon River
alone," Neuberger told realty board members from five Pacific Northwest
states, "could support an aluminum industry which would dwarf even that
in our own states of Oregon and Washington. Much of this economic
pro9ress is bound to spillover into the states which are Alaska's
neighbors.,,(l)
The Corps Promotes Rampart
In October 1959, Governor William A. Egan of Alaska announced that
work by the Corps of Engineers on a survey of the engineering and eco-
nomic feasibility of Rampart had begun. (2) On the same date, a corps
official, Harold L. Moats, chief of the civil works planning branch,
described Rampart to the Anchorage Chamber of Commerce. Since the high
cost of power was an endemic Alaskan problem, the chamber was cheered to
hear that Rampart hydroelectric power could be produced for a mere two
mills per kilowatt hour at the dam. Moats also explained that the
experiences of Russians and Scandanavians indicated that Rampart power
could be transmitted by ultra high voltage to Seward, Anchorage, and
Valdez for only an additional mill per kilowatt hour. In fact, the
Rampart area appeared to be the only place left in the United States
where water power could be developed to electric power for less than
four mills per kilowatt hour.
Moats suggested other benefits of the proposed 1.3 billion dollar
project as well. The 470-foot dam would probably raise the mean annual
air temperature of the area one or two degrees, perhaps making the sur-
rounding territory suitable for agriculture. According to the press,
Moats assured his audience that Rampart "would be justified by the
amount of industrial development that would take place in its wake."
But he warned his listeners that "it will be many years before the first
kilowatt can be wrung out of Rampart.,,(3)
Congress's initial appropriation of $49,000 for the Rampart study
in 1960 was supplemented for 1961 by a further $225,000 to the Corps of
Engineers. Early in 1961 the Alaskan congressional delegation announced
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the appointment of an eight-member economic advisory board which would
address itself to an economic study to be carried out by a private firm
selected by the Corps of Engineers. Its members included W. T. Kegley,
Governor Egan's representative; Dr. William R. Wood, President of the
University of Alaska; Irene Ryan, Anchorage mining engineer; Stanley J.
McCutcheon, Anchorage attorney; Frank H. Mapleton, Fairbanks mechanical
engineer; Dr. Edward Steve Shaw, Stanford University economist; Samuel
B. Morris, Los Angeles consulting engineer; and Gus Norwood, executive
secretary of the Northwest Public Power Association. Corps plans for
the 1961 winter included economic study, dam structure study, and
reservoir investigation. It was also announced that the U. S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, a unit of the Department of the Interior, would make
an independent study of the effects on wildlife of such a project as
Rampart. (4)
In April 1961, Harold L. Moats of the corps reported on progress to
a meeting of Anchorage civil engineers. He stated that an "exhaustive
economic study" by a private consulting firm which he did not name,
would probably take two years to determine the project's economic
feasibility. He also described the drilling, topographic, and hydro-
graphic work which the corps was carrying on. (5)
Moats was cautiously optimistic about the project: "Rampart is so
large that many people consider it as something that must be considered
for the far-distant future. That is not necessarily so. Our studies
show that with full authorization and proper allocation of construction
funds it is physically possible that Rampart could start producing a
substantial amount of power for industry by 1971-72." It would take
about 20 years to fill the huge reservoir but "it also takes some time
to develop an industrial complex that can utilize a block of power of
about 5 million kilowatts." (6)
Moats recognized such problems as the effects of extreme cold on
the project and of the dam on spawning fish and migrating game, but felt
that such difficulties would be overcome.
In public presentations made by Moats and Colonel Christian Han-
burger of the Corps during the winter and spring of 1961, the corps
spokesman stressed the long-range view of power needs, while stating
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that full economic studies must still be made. Alaskans responded
gladly to prospects for future industrial developments suggested by the
corps officials. It was cheering to hear that "even Rampart's total
capacity wi 11 be i nsuffici ent for the future demands of power-hungry
industries--industries which process metal ores through electrical
processes and industries that are auxiliary to these." Such industries
as these "must locate where the power is cheapest."(?)
It was not the corps's policy to refer directly to the power pro-
jects of other agencies, such as the Devil Canyon proposal of the Bureau
of Reclamation; however, Hanburger did assure Alaskans that "there is
not another project in the planning stages in Alaska which could be
built and on the line in 10 years with this kind of low-cost power.,,(8)
This was a valid reference to Devil Canyon, which was the only other
possible rival to Rampart, and which was then being planned by a rival
federal agency.
Bureau of Reclamation Competes
In 1959 the Bureau of Reclamation's report on the Devil Canyon
project expressed favorable prospects for the Susitna River basin which
was "ideal in many respects for initiating a substantial hydroelectric
development program in the Railbelt of Alaska." Such power could be
produced at a reasonable cost of five or six mills per kilowatt hour to
the consumer. Another study released by the bureau early in 1961 was
equally optimistic about the two dam projects which would include a
580,000 kilowatt capacity power plant, a capacity nearly ei9ht times the
current production of all power plants in Alaska. As Reclamation Com-
missioner Floyd Dominy put it in a Boston speech at a meeting of the
Associated General Contractors, "This energy could be a major factor in
unlocking Alaska's industrial development.,,(9)
Clearly the Bureau of Reclamation was reacting to the corps's
push for the Rampart Dam project. Initially, the Bureau commissioner
avoided specific references to the rival Corps of Engineers Rampart
project, but the thrust of his remarks clearly formed an argument:
Devil Canyon was big enough to meet anticipated power needs and foster
industrial development.
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It appeared that battle lines were being drawn between the two
projects. There was nothing illegal or tawdry in the rival agencies'
appeals to the public. In fact, it looked in 1961 as if interested
parties would be given a choice of power alternatives which, in the
democratic process, was certainly a healthy situation. Before long the
power issue was sharpened in the public forum. In September 1960,
Floyd E. Dominy, Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation told a Senate
Interior and Insular Affairs Committee that Rampart was not needed and
its consideration should be postponed indefinitely and that the Bureau
of Reclamation offered a better answer to power needs. Dominy submitted
his agency's feasibility report on the Susitna River, "a more modest
program... to meet the Rail belt's needs for years to come." Devil Canyon
and the other proposed Susitna projects "can keep ahead of growing
requirements. ,,(10)
The modest proposal of the Bureau did not go unnoticed by Rampart
proponents. Senator E. L. Bartlett of Alaska charged Dominy with
attempting to "dynamite" Rampart, a stance "in keeping with the 'do-
nothing' policy of the Republican administration in western power
development." Bartlett apparently believed that more was involved than
the traditional Bureau of Reclamation-Corps of Engineers rivalry;
Dominy's statement reflected a Republican election tactic to discredit
the Rampart project. The "limited present market" argument, he stated,
was a familiar echo of Republican sentiment, an argument used earlier
"against Grand Coulee and the other great dams of the West." (11)
Bartlett insisted that Democrats were not supporting Rampart to the
exclusion of other projects, like Devil Canyon: "We are strongly for
the multi-stage development of the Susitna.,,(12) Obviously Bartlett
knew well that Congress was not likely to fund Susitna projects in
addition to Rampart, but did not find it necessary to explain that.
Looking back now to the 1960-61 period, it is possible to see that
Alaska's power proponents led by Senator Ernest Gruening determined that
one project should be presented to Congress, and that would be Rampart.
It would not do to divert attention to Devil Canyon or any other alter-
native. Once this decision was made, only limited means of calling
attention to Devil Canyon remained. ~Iithout backing from either Alaskan
public officials or state newspapers, the Bureau of Reclamation had
.
little chance to rally support for the Susitna project.
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r1arket Study
It was May 1961 when the corps announced the grantin9 of a $120,000
contract for the evaluation of Rampart's economic benefits. The Devel-
opment and Resources Corporation of New York was selected "from among
seven advisory corporations of international renown."(1.3) David E.
Lilienthal, formerly chairman of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, was
chairman of the board for the organization and its president, Gordon R.
Clapp, had formerly chaired the board of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
This respected organization had one year in which to conduct the study
which would determine the size of the market for Rampart's power, basing
its analysis on existing data and projections for the future.
According to the corps, the corporation would start with several
major premises: that the U. S. population was expected to rise sharply
as reported by the U. S. Department of Commerce; that the gross national
product would increase to $570 billion by 1965 and $2,300 billion by
2010; that personal income would increase; that employment and business
activity would continue on a high level such that the standard of living
for the U. S. and the world would continue to grow; and, finally, that
technology in the major power-using industries would develop along lines
then generally recognized as feasible for the future.
Given such premises and the hydropower orientation of the organ-
ization's officials, the corps might have had reason to believe that the
Development and Resources Corporation would not be dismayed by the
potential of Rampart.
The corps was not indifferent to its public reputation. Fairly or
not, opponents of that agency had frequently charged that its only
concern was in building dams, regardless of particular needs and other
considerations. Opponents of Rampart were already voicing this senti-
ment, and Colonel Christian Hanburger tried to remove any impression of
over-eagerness ina seri es of pub1i c pronouncements in August 1961.
Speaking to the Fairbanks Chamber of Commerce, Hanburger stressed that
Rampart could not be built unless a market existed for the enormous
amount of power which would be produced. Feasibility did not depend
upon the suitable conditions for construction: "We must know that there
will be a market for the power ... it must be proven that what can be
8
produced can be used to benefit Alas ka and the na ti on. " And th i s
crucial factor was to be determined by an assessment of an independent
agency--not by the corps itself; this was why the corps had contracted,
with much attendant publicity, with the Development and Resources
Corporation. Hanburger admitted that neither present nor future power
needs in Alaska justified a project of Rampart's capacity. There was a
"dire need" for cheap power in Alaska, but "we cannot afford to go out
and develop power to the extent that we will have a large block of it
sitting around unsold.,,(14) i/hat the corps needed was some assurance
that Rampart's construction would trigger industrial growth, i.e., that
users would establish plants in Alaska in order to use the cheap power.
Hanburger's cautious assessment did not deter suc~ Rampart proponents
as Alaska's Senator Ernest Gruening, who were not worried about excess
power since they believed that a surplus of power could attract much-
needed industry to Alaska. Their view followed a historic Alaskan
pattern which had been expressed again and again in the past, namely,
that if a resource or a transport means were first made available, swift
development would follow inevitably. In this view, providing the
resource first was not putting the cart before the horse; on the contrary,
it was the rational pattern for prospective development. In fairness to
their view of things, it was difficult to forecast what future power
needs might develop. According to Hanburger's estimate, Rampart, if all
studies proved favorable to construction, would not generate power
before 1971 or 1972. Perhaps by that time, its proponents reasoned,
industrial demands for power will have multiplied many times beyond
current expectations. A matter of faith in Alaska's potential was
involved.
Gruening's Leadership
Senator Ernest Gruening's great interest in Rampart became apparent
in the spring of 1961. After a visit to the dam site by Army engineers
and the advisory board, Gruening told the press "we're going to get
Rampart." His expression was to be repeated often from that point and
amounted to something of a war cry for the project. The dam's cost was
estimated to be some $1,300,000,000, a huge sum, but justified by Gruening
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and the Corps of Engineers because of the expected low cost of power
which would be produced.
The New York Times reported on Gruening's campaign and on the Devil
Canyon study in June 1961 and noted that conservationists and power
developers were frequently in conflict over hydroelectric projects.
"r~oreover, rival ry frequently arises between the Corps of Engineers and
the Federal Bureau of Reclamation." Gruening's strategy with regard to
the rivalry was to emphasize the comparative costs of Rampart and Devil
Canyon power--two mills per kilowatt hour for Rampart against an esti-
mated six mills for Devil Canyon. And Gruening questioned whether Devil
Canyon power would even be as cheap as six mills, arguing that the cost
would actually be eight mills unless "Congress waived the interest
charges on the fifty-year, $500,000,000, project." (15)
It is not clear that the public had much of an opportunity to
compare the Rampart and Devil Canyon projects. The Bureau of Reclamation
had a very limited forum for presenting its case and the proponents of
Rampart did not expend much effort in drawing comparisons. Indeed,
there was no way Alaskans could know that their support of Rampart would
be useless and that the struggle would set back hydroelectric power
development for years. In retrospect we can see that the all-out struggle
had just this effect, yet at the time no one could reasonably have
presented the competing probabilities cogently.
Efforts to elicit a public attitude did not come to anything.
When, for example, the members of the Greater Anchorage Chamber of
Commerce reviewed figures on Rampart, Devil Canyon, and a proposed
Bradley Lake project presented by its power committee, theY were unable
to agree on any recommendations. All the group could do was reaffirm
earlier requests stating the need for power. As the press reported, the
chamber "could not come to an understanding of which project or which
interim generating facility would be most advantageous to back.,,(16)
Who should the public have looked to for disinterested leadership
in 1961? Alaska's congressional representatives urged Rampart in terms
which excluded other considerations, while Governor Egan's position was
not clearly expressed. Organized presentation of the situation was thus
left to Gruening and the Yukon Power for America lobby, except for the
efforts of the Bureau of Reclamation, the Corps of Engineers, the Alaska
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Conservation Society, and the proponents of coal power. In Alaska, only
the pro-Rampart voice was a strong one, but, as it turned out, the
weight of opinion expressed in Alaska was not decisive.
The argument of conservationists was expressed forcefully by Alaska
State Representative Jay Hammond after he and others convinced the state
legislature ,in its 1961 resolution to abandon a blanket endorsement of
Rampart. Legislators agreed to call for the federal government's accel-
eration of biological, mineralogical, and sociological studies in order
that they not lag behind engineering feasibility studies. Hammond
expressed concern over the effects of Rampart on the fish, wildfowl, and
people of the region, and wondered that Alaskans, who repeatedly pro-
tested federal land withdrawals, would endorse the huge Rampart with-
drawal without question.
Other sources of power should be considered, Hammond suggested,
"The Rampart has already, and no doubt will continue, to de-emphasize
less imaginative, more immediately available and perhaps more feasible
sources of power. Rampart proponents say that these will not be needed
when the great dam is built. "Could it possibly be the converse is also
true: if other power sources are developed, would there by any need for
Rampa rt?" (17)
Hammond also questioned the Corps's and Gruening's thesis that
cheap and abundant power was the key to Alaska's development. A study
of the economy commissioned by the legislature and made by the Arthur D.
Little Company denied this thesis, stating flatly that industrial devel-
opment would not necessarily follow the creation of a large power source.
In the 1964 legislature, Hammond and others checked a move by
Rampart supporters to get state funding for dam lobbying. The House
resolution cautioned against the use of state funds in promotion of
federal action prior to the completion of studies on the project.
An Alternative?
The mounting criticism of Rampart split the ranks of hydropower
proponents who feared long-term delays would create a stalemate in the
power situation. C. W. Snedden, publisher of the Fairbanks DaiZy News-
Miner, threw his support behind Devil Canyon in April 1961. Snedden
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argued that "Devil Canyon offers no conflict with the huge, long-range
Rampart project. Rather, it offers a first step to lower power costs in
the immediate future while we await the necessary but lengthy engi-
neering, authorization and construction periods of a project of the
magnitude of Rampart." The Bureau of Reclamation forecasts for Susitna
would answer a great need and could reduce power costs to' Fairbanks
users to a fraction of its present cost: "Less than seven years after
the project receives approval from Congress and the President, con-
struction should be completed on the first stage." (18)
Snedden had supported the Yukon Power for America organization but,
unlike others, he was prepared to look at alternatives. He perhaps read
the signs of Rampart's fate more clearly than did other supporters, or
did not agree with their unstated but obvious belief that boosting Devil
Canyon threatened Rampart.
The Anchorage Daily News editorialized in favor of Devil Canyon on
several occasions. In October 1961 it cited the recommendation of the
Alaska Chapter of the National Electrical Contractors Association, a
group which "once again strongly recommended construction of the Devil
Canyondam." The contractors predicted an urgent need within five years
for additional power supp1 ies and observed that Rampart "is still in the
dream stage with ten years of engineering and study ahead of it," whil e
President John F. Kennedy and Secretary of Interior Morris K. Udall had
already "given the go ahead" to the Susitna project. "Look to the
Susitna for immediate needs," urged the News, "while pursuing Rampart as
an overall super power plant for not only Alaska but all of northern
North America.,,(19) In January of the same year the News made the same
point: "If there is a choice, which when it comes to getting in on
federal monies there must be, it would seem wiser to concentrate on
Devil Canyon at this time." (20)
And, once again in r~ay 1961, the same sewspaper editorial ized on
the dam issue. The report from the Resources Development Corporation
was due some time in ~1ay, and "around it may swing Alaska's future.,,(21)
According to the editor, the market study would determine the fate of
Rampart.
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Market Favorable
The Development and Resources Corporation reported in April 1962.
Gordon R. Clapp, the research organization's president made it clear in
his letter of transmittal to the Corps of Engineers that his team had
directed itself to the essential question: "Can the power output of the
Rampart project be marketed if and when the project is built?" And the
answer after completing the study was conclusive: "We have reached the
conclusion that the power output ... can be reached." Study of market
trends indicated that a demand for the power would follow its existence.
Industries requiring cheap power would locate in various regions of the
state for the specific purpose of utlizing Rampart power. Not only
would industry use the anticipated power from Rampart but would probably
require even more. Thus the research organization echoed the old theme
of Alaska's boosters: let the government provide the necessary stimu-
lation and development would follow. As Clapp put it: "Rampart should
be considered as a stage of the development of Alaska to the benefit of
the nation.,,(22)
Division of Responsibility
According to earlier Corps' pronouncements, the favorable market
report should have signaled a significant green light along the road to
eventual passage of an appropriations bill for the construction of
Rampart. Yet shortly before the report was issued, its impact was
negated by an agreement between the Secretary of the Interior and Secretary
of the Army. After considerable negotiation, the secretaries had resolved
to end the long rivalry between the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers and
the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation, and eliminate
the duplication of effort and responsibility in dam projects. Congress-
men and executive officers had called for such cooperation for years,
and the agreement seemed to bring the long competition to an end.
Projects in Alaska, the Columbia River Basin, and the r1issouri River
Basin were subjects of the compromise. Henceforth the Bureau of Recla-
mation was charged with responsibility for all economic feasibility and
power-marketing studies and the operation of completed projects in
Alaska, while the corps would handle engineering studies and construction.
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Rampart was treated specifically in the agreement. The corps would
complete its studies of the project, yet the Department of the Interior
would undertake studies of the projects' effects on natural resources
and investigate the marketing potential as well. It is not clear why an
agreement to end duplication of efforts would specifically mandate
duplication in Rampart's case, unless the feeling existed in some
quarters that the study commissioned by the corps might be questionable.
At any rate, the agreement opened the way for more studies and effectively
limited the corps's overall responsibility for evaluating Rampart. At
some future date, the corps would have to render a decision, but would
need to consider the findings of the Department of the Interior before
acting on Rampart.
The Bureau of Reclamation funded another market study over a two-
year period (1963-65) at a cost of $250,000, and the Department of the
Interior awaited the results of studies which its various divisions were
still carrying on. Meanwhile, the controversies raised by conservationists
and sports interests were drawing nationwide attention to Rampart. Senator
Gruening had more to worry about now than the slow machinery of govern-
ment as the public debate widened.
When the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service warned against Rampart in
January 1963, Rampart proponents received their first substantial setback.
Now the conservationists and sportsmen had the aid of a strongly worded
report from an Interior Department agency to provoke public comment.
The odds shifted as a consequence.
Yukon Power for America
Gruening hoped to offset the growing conservationist sentiment by
organizing a strong center for pro-Rampart opinion. In September 1963,
a meeting was held at Mt. McKinley Park which resulted in the formation
of Yukon Power for America, a lobbying group led by the mayors of
Anchorage and Fairbanks.
Gruening told the conferees in a keynote address that more una-
nimity existed for Rampart than had been expressed for statehood, and
professed not to understand the opposition of conservationists. Gruening
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and others questioned a conservationist view financed by gunmakers, a
reference to the support given the Alaska Conservation Society by
national sportsmen organizations. Ira Gabrielson, formerly of the U. S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, and then director of the Wildlife Management
Institute, was specifically attacked.
Sporting interests continued their campaign against Rampart. A
newsletter to all Boone and Crockett Club members from the Wildlife
/1anagement Institute called Rampart "the greatest boondoggle of all
time." Members were urged to protest the expenditure of 1.5 billion
dollars in publ ic funds while the market for Rampart power was "uncer-
tain, at best.,,(23) The important Yukon Het1ands would most certainly
be destroyed, warned the club, and these produced one and one-half
mi 11 i on ducks, geese, swans, and cranes each year, not to menti on
numerous other wild birds.
Gruening persisted with his advoc;l<:j' and found a new agrumen t in
support of Rampart. Studies indicated that Alaska had huge phosphate
deposits, he reported to a U. S. Senate Interior Committee, and Rampart
was needed to convert the phosphates into commercial products such as
detergents and fertilizer.
Gruening worked desperately to offset the public impact of the Fish
and Wildlife Service. His arguments before various groups ranged from
branding the agency's report as "untrue and unscientific" to his repeated
insistence that conservationists believed that "the two-legged species
is not entit1 ed to a habitat." (24) Peop1 e I s needs shou1 d be cons i dered
too, Gruening stated, and the bias of officials of the Fish and Wildlife
Service should be disregarded.
An examination of the public discussion in Alaska from 1959 throu9h
1964 shows the force of persistence. In 1961 there had been considerable
support for Devil Canyon. Two major newspapers, the Fairbanks Daily
News-Miner and the Anohorage Daily News favored the Susitna project as
an immediate goal which should be pursued, although neither paper pushed
particularly hard. Rampart was not to be abandoned, but the papers
argued that Devil Canyon construction should be achieved first. But
Alaska's governor and its congressional leaders rejected this approach
and insisted on reversing the priorities, and influential citizens fell
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in line by forming Yukon Power for America, a lobby for Rampart. The
very title of the association precluded a consideration of Devil Canyon;
it was to be Yukon power, that is, Rampart, or nothing. Conservationists
seemed to support Devil Canyon in 1961 too, but as the Rampart proponents
hardened their line, it was enough for conservationists to attack Rampart
without making mOre than vague references to other power alternatives.
Conservationists had seemed to favor Devil Canyon as an alternative
to Rampart in the early 196Ds. Celia Hunter of the Alaska Conservation
Society wrote the Anchorage Daily News in October 1963 of a "conspiracy
of silence" regarding alternatives and urged more consideration of Devil
Canyon because of its Railbelt location and its "clean bill of health
from the Fish and Wildlife Service biologists.,,(25) Robert B. Heeden,
wildlife biologist and spokesman for the Alaska Conservation Society
expressed similar views early in 1964, noting the favorable 1960 Fish
and Wildlife Service report: "This project, to me, is a much more
sensible one for Alaska. First, we could get it within seven years.
Second, it would produce eight times as much electricity as we now use
in the whole of Alaska, which should be enough for even dreamers.
Third, the power would be available 15 miles from the Alaska Railroad,
midway between Anchorage, and Fairbanks. Fourth, it would destroy few
valuable resources.,,(26)
Weeden made no secret of the fact that support for Devil Canyon had
strategic significance in the Rampart struggle: "In my opinion, one of
the best ways to squelch Rampart would be to stir up the latent support
present for other worthwhile power projects--like Taiya or Devil Canyon.
News media realize this, and Devil Canyon, for example, is never men-
tioned any more." (27) The Alaska Conservation Society spokesmen, Hunter
and Weeden, appeared to be sincere in favoring Devil Canyon and were not
simply bringing forward the Susitna project as a means of halting Rampart.
In March 1964, the Alaska Native Brotherhood adopted a resolution
withholding an endorsement of Rampart. Native leaders feared that the
rights of Natives of the Yukon were not adequately protected. This
resolution directly countered Gruening's insistence that Natives favored
the construction of Rampart, and it constituted an alliance between
Natives and conservationists. Thus a new element of opposition, poten-
tially a very potent one, entered the picture. From this point Rampart
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supporters could not argue that the project would benefit "all the
people."
The heaviest blow of all fell on Rampart proponents in May 1964
when the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service recommended against the dam in
a report indicating that the blow to wildlife would be overwhelming.
Another came indirectly in the form of the great earthquake which
devastated southcentral Alaska in March 1964. Rampart proponents were
divided upon the effect of the earthquake on the hydroelectric project.
C. W. Snedden argued that Congress would be unlikely to appropriate
money for Rampart following the appropriation of large sums for the
rehabilitation of southcentral Alaska. Other members of Yukon Power for
America felt that the earthquake might engender public sympathy which
would be favorable to Rampart.
Trustees ·of Yukon Power for America met at Sitka in May and were
addressed by Governor William Egan and Senator Bob Bartlett. Both
speakers urged them to push even harder for Rampart and both affirmed
"Rampart will be built"--the familiar rallying cry of proponents. The
trustees responded by calling for early construction and insisting that
the need for Rampart had not been diminished by the earthquake.
Despite the affirmative line maintained at the meeting, those close
to the situation saw that hope for Rampart was dim indeed. Time was
running out for the Yukon Power for America supporters. There was
nothing they could do after the double blow dealt by the Natives and the
U.S. Department of Fish and vJildlife in 1964. The Rampart project
continued to suffer as the conservationists accelerated their attacks on
the great project, and the final blow came when the Department of the
Interior's 1967 report to the Secretary of the Army, Alaska Natural
Resources and the Rampart Project, contradicted the firmly held positions
of Rampart's proponents.
Congress could hardly be expected to provide construction monies
unless the need for the project's power had been clearly established.
Even then, Congress would have to be convinced that the economic gains
offset any anticipated ecological disruptions. On both counts the
Department of the Interior's conclusions were adverse to Rampart: the
power market did not seem to exist and the ecological effects would be
drastic.
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Without making direct reference to the Resources and Development
Corporation's optimistic report to the corps on the ample potential
Rampart power market, the Department of the Interior dismissed its
findings: "The fragmentary and inconclusive data available concerning
Alaska mineral resources, together with uncertainties with respect to
competitive world resources and markets for potential Alaska products,
preclude accurate forecasting of the industrial development likely to
occur in Alaska with the availability of low-cost power. ,,(28)
The Department of the Interior acknowledged the importance of
"aiding Alaska, in the national interest, to develop an economy based
increasingly on development and processing in Alaska of Alaska resources,~
and submitted that Rampart would be a catalyst to such development.
"However, a basic requirement of each proposal of federal assistance
should be that it constitutes the most desirable means of accomplishing
a merited objective and the Rampart project does not stand this test.,,(29)
Thus the department's adverse conclusions were not based on differences
with Rampart proponents on the philosophy of goverment, but on matters
of economy and ecology.
The Department of the Interior found that the only industry likely
to be attracted to Alaska for cheap power was that of aluminum production,
and it evaluated the usage and costs which could reasonably be established.
The resulting figures showed that power rates would be too high to
attract aluminim production to Alaska, and other studies proved that
transmission costs of Rampart power to the Northwest would preclude
marketing there. "In the absence of such demands for large blocks of
the project power tremendous financial investments required for ... and
the availability of favorable, less costly power alternatives," The
Department of the Interior could not recommend construction. (30)
The Department of the Interior noted that its field reports were
also reviewed by the University of Michigan. This study, funded by the
Natural Resources Council of America, reviewed ecological and economic
consequences of the Rampart project as reported by the corps. The
Department of the Interior did not further cite the Michigan studies,
but knowledge of them could not have influenced the department to favor
Rampart. Michigan researchers did not agree that considerable population
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and industrial increase could be anticipated and concluded that the
Development and Resources Corporation tried to uphold a preconceived
position "that Rampart Dam's market would be justified by 1isting all
possible industries that could use up its electrical output.,,(11)
As for the ecological questions, the Department of the Interior
pointed out that the Fish and Wildlife Service had estimated an annual
wildlife loss of 1.5 million ducks, 12,800 geese, 10,000 cranes, 20,000
grebes, 13,000 moose, and 3.6 million commercial fur animals. Additionally,
between 231,300 and 430,000 anadromous fish would be lost each year.
Some mitigation measures could reduce these losses but "full replacement
of losses of fish and wildlife resources would not be feasible or
possible." Without calculation the loss monetarily, assuming mitigation
features such as salmon ladders were constructed, Fish and Wildlife
believed "the losses would be so great as to hazard achievement of a
favorable benefit-cost ratio for the project.,,(32)
The Department of the Interior asked the National Academy of
Sciences to review the fish and wildlife findings. The academy's review
overwhelmingly contradicted the arguments of Rampart proponents who had
argued that losses could be offset by gains:
1. The Yukon Wetlands, with its rivers, vast networks of marshes,
and lakes and potholes, is one of the finest fish, wildlife, big game,
and small game production areas in North America.
2. Construction of the Rampart dam would destroy the productivity
of Jhe Yukon Wetlands in renewable resources, and leave in its stead a
huge windswept 1ake, an unsati sfactory habitat for wild1 i fe.
3. If Rampart dam is constructed, individual animals might
survive flooding of the reservoir area, but the likelihood that popu-
lations of animals would survive is extremely doubtful. Other habitats
to which these populations might migrate are already supporting all the
life forms they can.
4. Construction of the Rampart dam would result in the destruc-
tion of the valuable up-river salmon stocks. On the other hand, the
committee is not convinced that the four proposals for mitigation of the
effects on fishing of the Rampart dam are feasible; and, if feasible,
that they would be successful.
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5. The Yukon Wetlands presently contributes more than one million
waterfowl annually to the continental duck population. The proposed
waterfowl mitigation measures would be almost prohibitively expensive
and would ultimately contribute less than a third of the present water-
fowl production. The reservoir would not provide suitable nesting
habitats, marshes, and shallow water areas because of its relativelY
steep banks, rising waters as the reservoir is filling, and later,
because of wave action and ice push.
6. Big game, small game, and various fur-bearing animals would
also disappear. Mitigation measures for resident game populations are
not feasible.
7. It seems inconceivable that serious thought is given to the
investment of more than $650 million to support mitigation programs
whose feasibil ity and 1ikel ihood of success can only be regarded as
extremely problematical. There is need for thorough comparative evalu-
ation of the benefits from both the present situation and those rea-
sonably expected from the proposed impoundment.
8. Construction of the dam would destroy a highly productive area
which is presently benefiting the whole of North America at no cost. (33)
Any assessment of the Rampart Dam project raises certain consider-
ations, the chief of which is whether Congress was ever likelY to fund
such a gigantic venture. It may be that its very size might have
created enough enthusiasm, but we can never know with any certainty.
Traditionally, Democrats have taken great pride in similar engineering
marve1s, notably the Grand Coul ee Dam and the Tennessee Va 11 ey Authority,
and the Democrats surged to executive power with John Kennedy's election
as president in 1960. Yet there were other national priorities competing
for funds in the 1960s, particularly as the Vietnam conflict escalated.
Economic considerations aside, the period was one of increasing awareness
of the impact of development on the natural environment, and national
conservation sentiment against the dam was displayed effectively. Heavy
conservationist pressure was brought to bear on the Department of the
Interior and such pressure would have been felt acutely by Congress, if
the department had recommended construction.
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It is certainly arguable that Rampart's prospects were never very
good. If this were the case, why did it go as far as it did, and what
were the effects of the campaign? In answer to the first question, it
seems clear that the dynamic leadership of Senator Ernest Gruening
provided much of the impetus. He inspired the project, rallied support
in Alaska and elsewhere, and badgered government agencies relentlessly.
It was as if Gruening saw Rampart as the climax of his brilliant political
career. He insisted that the project was not a visionary or romantic
one, but one of the eminent practicality, a means of solving with one
blow the decades-long dilemma of the Alaskan economy. He was a wise man
and a cagey fighter but could not realize his hopes when too many experts
disagreed with his analysis of the dam's value.
Gruening lost his campaign and the struggle had important effects
on Alaska. Success gave the conservationists in and outside of Alaska
an assurance that inspired their further organizational efforts; and it
provided a platform for Native's opposition to federal policies which
was to bear fruit in the land claims dispute.
These were positive gains; were there negative results? Some of
the proponents of Devil Canyon certainly considered this to be the case.
But for Rampart, Devil Canyon might be producing power today.
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SUSITNA (DEVIL CANYON)
The history of the Devil Canyon proposal shows complexities beyond
those related to the Rampart question.
The nineteenth Alaska territorial legislature, meeting in early
1949 in Juneau, addressed a joint memorial to the President of the
United States, the Congress, the Secretary of the Interior, the Bureau
of Reclamation and the delegate from Alaska, asking that Alaska be
included in the Bureau of Reclamation program with participation under
the Reclamation Funds. The memorialists pointed out that the Bureau of
Reclamation had operated since 1902 in the western states and played a
substantial role in developing irrigation projects and reclaiming lands
in that re~ion. Since 1939 the bureau's responsibilities had been
enlarged to include the construction of hydroelectric power projects.
Inclusion of Alaska into the bureau's program, the memorialists main-
tained, would result in the expansion of utilities and other services
with consequent acceleration of settlement. This. in turn, would
strengthen the territory as a buffer area in the interest of national
defense. (34)
Subsequently, the Department of the Interior provided $150,000 to
be used by the Bureau of Reclamation to update its Alaskan investi-
gations of 1948. The results of these studies were to be used as a
basis for legislation authorizing the development of the territory's
water resources.
In its final report, published in 1952, the Bureau of Reclamation
identified a large number of possible hydroelectric power sites through-
out Alaska. The bureau pointed out that, among all the potential
rivers, the Susitna River was the most strategically situated of all
Alaska streams because of its proximity to Anchorage and Fairbanks and
the connecting railbelt. The Susitna River basin occupies the northern
half of the Cook Inlet area. It is bounded on the west and north by the
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Alaska Range, and on the east by the Copper River Plateau. The Susitna
River enters Cook Inlet 25 miles west of Anchorage. The main stream
originates in a series of glacier-bearing peaks some 90 miles south of
Fairbanks and 200 miles north of Anchorage of which Mt. Hayes at 13,940
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feet is the highest. For the first 50 miles the river meanders generally
southward over a broad alluvial fan and plateau after which it turns
sharply westward for 75 miles through a practically continuous canyon
incised in a high-level broad valley; it then travels southwest for 125
miles in a broad lowland. The Susitna has five principal tributaries:
The Maclaren River originating in the Alaska Range, the Tyone River from
the Talkeetna Mountains, the Chulitna River from the Alaska Range in
Mount McKinley National Park, the Talkeetna River from the Talkeetna
Mountains, and finally the Yentna River system which drains a large
portion of the Alaska Range. (35)
The Bureau of Reclamation identified three possible damsites on the
Susitna River, labeled sites Nos. 1 through 3. The first was near the
upstream end of the 75-mi1e canyon section some 17 miles below the mouth
of the Tyone River. The bureau envisioned a main dam in the steep-
walled rock canyon, 100 feet wide at the bottom. A concrete dam some
575 feet high with a crest length of 12,00 feet would create a reservoir
with 9,000,000 acre-feet of active capacity. The bureau estimated that
a power plant at this site would generate more than 2,000,000,000 kwh
of firm energy each year. (36)
The second site was located 36 miles below the first at a location
where the valley bottom is less than 300 feet wide and rock slopes rise
far above the river at 45° angles. A concrete dam raising the water 425
feet would create a reservoir reaching to the tai1water of site No. 1
and contain some 1,000,000 acre-feet of active storage space. The
annual power output at this plant would exceed 2,000,000,000 kwh of
fi rm energy. (37)
The third site, or Devil Canyon Site, was located 30 miles down-
stream from the second site. At this location, the rock walls rise
steeply, almost vertically in places, to heights of 600 to 1,000 feet
above the stream. A dam high enough to raise the water 525 feet would
have a crest length of 1,000 feet and create backwater to site No.2.
The active storage capacity would be 1,000,000 acre-feet and the annual
firm energy production would amount to more than 2,600,000,000 kwh. (18)
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The Bureau of Reclamation had focused attention on Alaska's vast
water resources, pointing out that more than half the hydropower potential
remaining in America was found in the territory. And, in order to meet
some of Anchorage's power needs, Congress authorized the Bureau of
Reclamation to build a relatively small installation at Eklutna near
Anchorage in the early 1950s.
Since the early 1950s, both the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps
of Engineers have conducted studies identifying the various viable
hydropower sites in Alaska. After release of a favorable feasibility
study in May of 1960, formal review was initiated in 1961. The Department
of the Interior proposed authorization of Devil Canyon and Denali, and
transmission facilities to Anchorage and Fairbanks. At a cost of
$498,874,000, the project was designed to produce a large block of low-
cost power serving as a catalyst, according to Secretary of the Interior
Stewart L. Udall, for expanding the population and bringing industrial
development to the railbelt area.
Unfortunately, the Department of the Interior's timing paralleled
initial moves on the Rampart project by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers.
Shortly thereafter, the Department of the Army recommended deferring any
action on Devil Canyon until the Rampart studies were completed. For
all practical purposes, the recommendation shelved the Devil Canyon
proposal for the time being. (39)
Some Alaskans continued to advocate Devil Canyon. William A. Egan,
Alaska's governor, voiced his concern that, despite predictions of a
doubling of energy demands within ten years·, virtually no additional
power generati on facil i ti es were under cons tructi on. The governor also
urged that the six-mill estimate for Devil Canyon be reappraised since
Alaska needed low-cost power for industrial development. Various
chambers of commerce supported the Devil Canyon project as did the
Alaska Chapter of the National Electrical Contractors Association. The
latter organization had put on a drive "to sell electric heat." It had
received a guarantee of cost of operation to the consumer from both the
Chugach Electric Association and the Golden Valley Electric Association.
The new rates made electric heat competitive with oil and gas heating.
"The public is hungry for the all-electric house" and "quite a number of
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buildings have been contracted for without any publicity. So we are
bound and determined to sell more power than they have available, and to
force a development of electric power generation." But despite support
for Devil Canyon, it was the Rampart proposal which had captured the
public imagination. Described as "the daddy of all power projects" on
the North American continent by its proponents, it did not matter that
the proposal was still in the "dream stage" and needed at least ten
years of further studies. The sheer size of the grand project attracted
many supporters. Devil Canyon paled ins i gnificance when compared to
Rampart. (40)
The Army-Interior agreement of 1962, already referred to, had
assigned leading responsibilities for comprehensive hydropower develop-
ment investigation in Alaska to the latter department. The agreement
had assigned design and construction responsibilities for Alaska water
projects to the Corps of Engineers. While the corps prepared a Rampart
study, the Bureau of Reclamation contributed a natural resource and
power market investigation to the corps's project, but also accomplished
considerable additional work on the power potential of the Upper Susitna.
The Department of the Interior issued its report, entitled "Alaska
Natural Resources and the Ramparts Project," in 1967. In it, it appraised
the various power alternatives and proposed a tentative plan for the
railbelt area. The investigators recommended an initial interconnection
ofthe Anchorage and Fairbanks areas and construction of well-head, gas-
fired thermal plants in the Cook Inlet area, together with such mine-
mouth, coal-fired thermal plants in the Cook Inlet and Healy areas as
appeared economical. For the near future, the Department of the Interior
envisioned the expansion of thermal plants because of the relatively low
construction costs involved, but also recommended the construction of
hydroelectric developments, such as individual dams on the Upper Susitna
River and the Bradley Lake project. The department realized that the
costs of hydroelectric power development consisted almost entirely of
very high construction investments. Since hydropower must be generated
near the site of falling water, it often requires extensive and expensive
transmission facilities as well. The principal advantage of hydropower
is that electricity is generated from falling water, a renewable resource
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which is free. Furthermore, operation and maintenance costs are very
minor. Competing thermal plants, while relatively cheap to construct,
are susceptible to rising fossil-fuel costs throughout the life span
of the installation and also are relatively expensive to maintain and
operate. (41)
While most studies by federal agencies and railbelt area utilities
after the 1967 Department of the. Interior report focused on the ,;Jeneration
of electricity by low-cost Cook Inlet gas, interest in the Susitna
project continued on a low level. Finally, in January of 1972, the U. S.
Senate Public Works Committee, at the urging of Senator Ted Stevens
(R., Alaska) passed a resolution calling on the Corps of Engineers to
study the Upper Susitna and a 1973 resolution by the Alaska State Legislature
requested the Department of the Interior to update its feasibility
report on the Susitna project. In response, the corps requested the
necessary funds from Congress for its 1974 fiscal year budget to under-
take the study. The Office of Management and Budget, however, dis-
allowed the funds. (42) Obviously, it did not consider the Alaskan project
to have a high priority.
Energy Crisis
A new urgency in looking at alternatives to fossil fuels had been
forced upon the United States by the Arab oil boycott in 1973. In an
effort to bring about a change in American policy toward Israel, the
Arab countries had cut off oil suppl ies to the United States. The
pressure to develop reliable domestic energy supplies became almost
irresistible. By late 1973, Americans were shivering through a cold
winter and debated the energy crisis. And, perhaps for the first time,
most realized that the era of cheap and plentiful energy had come to an
end.
Appropriately enough, Senator Hike Gravel (D., Alaska), the chair-
man of the Senate Water Resources Subcommittee, announced in January of
1974 that his group had authorized the expenditure of $50,000 for
updating the 1960 Bureau of Reclamation feasibility study of the Susitna
project. The Army Corps of Engineers was to complete the study that
very same summer and as early as 1975 Congress could be asked to authorize
a study of the site and design for the project. An appropriation to
begin construction, if all went well, could be proposed as early as
1976. (43)
Early in that same year the other members of Alaska's congressional
delegation, Senator Ted Stevens (R., Alaska) and Representative Don
Young (R., Alaska) introduced legislation which would authorize con-
struction of the Susitna project. Under the terms of the pending bills,
the corps would receive approximately $1 million to begin design work
based upon a review of the prior work performed by the Bureau of Reclamation.
It would also allow a preliminary analysis on transmission lines and
marketability of Susitna power by the Alaska Power Administration. (44)
Agency Involvement
Of the federal agencies which have become involved in the development
of hydroelectric power in Alaska, the two most important are the Department
of the Interior, through its Bureau of Reclamation, and the Corps of
Engineers. The former has had a long-standing interest in hydroelectric
development, dating back to 1906. In that year, Congress provided for
the development of power in addition to water control for irrigation and
other purposes. The Bureau of Reclamation originally inventoried the
hydroelectric potential of Alaska in the late 1940s. The only actual
development based on these investigations was the Eklutna project near
Anchorage, completed in 1955, which is discussed in detail elsewhere. (45)
As early as 1912, Congress instructed the Corps of Engineers to
include hydroelectric potential evaluations in its survey reports.
Since that time, the corps has developed hydroelectric proposals and
submitted them to Congress for authorization. Normally, the corps also
operated the projects it constructed. In 1944, Congress directed that
electricity generated at multiple-use reservoirs under corps jurisdiction
be turned over to the Department of the Interior for marketing. And
although the corps established its Alaska District in 1946, so far it
has constructed only the Snettisham project, begun in 1967 and completed
in 1973. But Juneau did not receive dependable power until 1976 because
of transmission line failures. (46)
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The 1962 agreement between the Secretaries of the Interior and Army
made the Bureau of Reclamation the planning, marketing, operation and
maintenance agent while the Corps of Engineers became the design and
construction agency. Finally, in 1967, the Department of the Interior
withdrew the Bureau of Reclamation from Alaska, and in its stead established
the Alaska Power Administration (APA) on June 16, 1967. APA took over
the staff and property of the Bureau of Reclamation, and maintains,
operates, and markets the power from the Eklutna and Snettisham projects.
APA also plans the development and use of Alaska's water power, analyzes
future electricity demands, and studies electrical transmission needs.
For example, APA activelY participated in the study of the Upper Susitna
Basin. (47) APA, an agency within'the Department of the Interior,
apparently was established to deal exclusively with Alaska's hydro-
electric potential.
The Federal Power Commission and the Rural Electrification Admini-
stration (REA) are also involved in Alaska's hydroelectric development.
The former grants licenses for nonfederal developments on federal lands,
collaborates with the corps in evaluating the economic feasibility of
new projects, approves power rates set by APA, reviews federal hydro-
electric developments, and possesses broad powers for planning. The
latter, established by Congress in 1936, makes loans for rural electri-
fication. Several REA cooperat~ve electric utilities operate in Alaska,
the largest of them the Chugach Electric Assocation of Anchorage. (48)
The Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation had a history
of vigorous competition in Alaska hydroelectric planning and development.
As already stated, the 1962 agreement between the corps and the Department
of the Interior did delineate the roles of the two agencies, but friction
apparently continued. For, as recently as 1975, APA expressed a desire
to enlarge its responsibilities by undertaking all preauthorization
planning, including so-called Level C or implementation studies. If APA
succeeds, this would give it complete responsibilities in all federal
water resource planning responsibilities, ranging from broad assessments
of regional water resource needs to carrying out specific engineering
and design projects. (49)
By 1974, much work had been accomplished on the Susitna project.
The Alaska Power Administration, provided with such a headstart, completed
the updating of the 1961 Bureau of Reclamation report on the Devil
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Canyon project on the Upper Susitna. The study included a more sophis-
ticated design, fresh cost estimates, a brief analysis of the power
market as well as environmental and economic assessments, and reaffirmed
the desirability and feasibility of the project. (50)
In that same year, the Alaska State Legislature passed additional
resolutions urging the development of hydroelectric resources generally
and supporting the Devil Canyon project specifically. Also in 197d ,
the Federal Power Commission published its Alaska Power Survey. It
concluded a statewide survey of existing and planned electrical generating
systems and an assessment of future needs and alternatives to the year
2000.
In the meantime, the State of Alaska, impatient with federal delays,
had hired the Henry J. Kaiser Company to reassess the Susitna project.
The consultants proposed yet another scheme, the construction of a high
dam upstream from Devil Canyon, in lieu of the Bureau of Reclamation
initial development plan of Devil Canyon plus Denali for the first
phase. Kaiser was considering the establishment of a large aluminum
plant in the railbelt area which was contingent upon the availability of
1arge blocks of cheap energy. (51)
Early in 1975, the Department of the Interior learned that the Corps
of Engineers had concluded that extensive additional foundation studies
would have to be undertaken on the Susitna River before any final decision
could be reached. The corps recommended construction at the Devil
Canyon and Watana sites as the first stage plan. The Department of the
Interior was concerned because the corps' plan would likely preclude the
dam at the vee site which it favored and which amounted to well over
one billion killowatt-houl:'s annual energy potential, a significant
portion of the total Susitna potential. (52)
Actually, the Department of the Interior had been uneasy about the
foundation at Denali for a long time. It considered the site feasible
for an earth dam, but had always preferred an alternative site if one
could be found. The 1961 Devil Canyon Report and the 1974 Status Report
had included very conservative design and cost assumptions for Denali
so as to prOVide reasonable assurances of overall feasibility. On this
basis, the department considered the Devil Canyon and Denali plans an
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appropriate basis for seeking Congressional authorization. But, unless
the corps provided further details on their new studies, the department
saw no reason for endorsing the change in plans. (53)
Meanwhile, the conservation-minded administration of Governor Jay
S. Hammond became involved in the Devil Canyon project when it created
an ad-hoc task force chaired by Commissioner of Commerce and Economic,
Development Langhorne A. Motley. The task force reviewed the Corps of
Engineers's proposal prior to its submission to Congress. Early in 1976,
Motley's group recommended that the administration endorse the corps
request for Congressional authorization of the project and further funds
for preconstruction planning. It requested, however, clarification of
several points in the corps analysis. The task force pointed out that
extensive further studies were needed to supply answers to compl ex
administrative, biological, environmental and socioeconomic questions.
Biological studies alone, ranging from salmon enumeration to spawning
and rearing, and from moose and caribou habitat to that of various small
fur bearers, were estimated to cost $3,709,000 between 1977 and 1981.
The task force also proposed that the Corps of Engineers have the Alaska
Power Administration develop a mechanism through which appropriate
state, federal, and local governmental authorities could participate in
the design and review the investigations designed to produce answers to
the many unanswered questions. (54)
Early in 1976, Alaska's mercurial U. S. Senator Mike Gravel (D.,
Alaska) decided to assume leadership in the drive to get the Susitna
project underway. On March 26, 1976, the senator addressed the Alaska
legislature on the subject of hydroelectric development in the state.
He pointed out that the Corps of Engineers had completed its Devil Canyon
study and would soon send its report and an environmental impact state-
ment to Congress recommending authorization of a two-dam system,
estimated to cost $1.5 billion, considerably more than the 1974 estimated
cost of $682,000,000. The next step would be to seek Congressional
authorization of the project. Gravel, as chairman of the Senate Water
Resources Subcommittee, felt confident of securing authorization. But
authorization was only half the battle--it would still be necessary to
secure financing. Both Republican and Democratic adminstrations had
expressed the desire to decrease federal participation in such public
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work projects, and repeatedly recommended that the beneficiaries of
water resource projects should bear in full the cost of construction,
operation, and maintenance of such projects. Although Congress had not
yet acted on these proposals, Gravel felt that it was only a matter of
time until these suggestions were accepted by the lawmakers.
While Congress dawdled, the administration had been cutting Corps
of Engineers' programs through the budgetary process. Its total program,
Gravel stated, had been funded at less than half that of ten years ago.
This allowed for finishing projects underway and operating and main-
taining completed projects. It did not allow new construction and very
few surveys. Clearly, the handwriting was on the wall. The federal
government obviously intended to ph~se out federal involvement in water
resources projects. Additionally, the nation perceived Alaska to be a
wealthy oil state. Too long had the state been coddled by the federal
government. The senator explained that, in fiscal year 197d, Alaskans
had paid .18 percent of the total tax burden of the entire United
States. Total federal spending in Alaska amounted to slightly more than
twice what Alaskans had paid in taxes. Dollar figures were even more
impressive. In the same year the federal government had spent approxi-
mately $1,321 per capita in the United States, while in Alaska this
amounted to $3,401 per capita. Congress, he predicted, would tell the
state to use its own fossil energy sources rather than asking it to
purchase an alternative energy source with other people's tax monies. (55)
Gravel described several Corps of Engineers' projects in various
parts of the country and concluded that it had taken an average of 18
years from the time of authorization to the receipt of the first con-
struction funds. For years, he continued, the corps had been criticized
for cost overruns on its projects when, in fact, "most overruns are a
product of erratic cash flows necessitated by federal budget constraints.,,(56)
Devil Canyon was estimated to cost $1.5 billion and would be the
largest corps' project ever, both because of inflated costs and the
scope of the undertaking. The advanced engineering and design work
alone, Gravel asserted, was to cost $50 million over a four-year period.
At an average of $12.5 million per year, that amounted to over 50 per-
cent of the money requested for advanced engineering and design for all
projects in the federal 1977 fiscal year budget. In other words, a
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project benefitting a little more than one tenth of one
total American population would be using better than 50
available funds designated for all projects. (57)
Senator Gravel argued the urgent need for a break with tradition.
Alaska must rely upon another means of financing hydroelectric projects.
The senator proposed that Congress appropriate monies to a revolving
fund equal to the phase one or the advanced engineering and design
portion of anyone project. The sponsoring state agency, in this case
the Alaska Power Authority, soon to be created by the state legislature,
would issue bonds based on the proposed project to pay the corps for the
phase-one work. In the event that the proposed development was not
feasible, the federal-revolving fund monies would be used to payoff the
state bonds. If, however, the proposed project proved to be feasible,
the Alaska Power Authority would issue revenue bonds and contract for
the work. Under the Gravel plan, the federal-revolving fund would act
solely as a guarantee for the phase-one costs incurred by the state
sponsor. (58)
Senator Gravel proposed broad new legislation, the Hydroelectric
Power Development Act of 1976, which would establish .a revolving fund
and stipulate that the federal government would assume the responsibility
of paying all cost increases caused by any delays in construction or
unforeseen conti ngenci es of various ki nds. If, for any reason, the
project was terminated before completion, the federal government would
fully reimburse the sponsoring state power authority for any losses
suffered. (59)
Comment on the senator's proposal was not confined to its novel
aspects of financing, but showed the range of opposition to hydroelectric
projects. A conservation agency, the Fairbanks Environmental Center,
opposed the project, claiming it could not be justified environmentally
or economically. Specifically, the center asserted that the project
would "have major biological impact and will destroy a unique wilderness
river basin." The Devil Canyon project, a two-dam system, would flood
some 50,500 acres of the Upper Susitna River, disrupting the migratory
patterns of the Nelchina caribou herd, destroying much of its habitat,
and subjecting it to increased hunting pressure. Much moose habitat
would be flooded as well, lowering the carrying capacity of the area
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while control of the hydrologic balance of the Susitna River could have
a significant impact on the downstream fisheries, particularly the
salmon.
The Anchorage DaiZy Times ignored the major issues and expressed
opposition to the corps's proposal to build elaborate recreational
facilities at the two manmade lakes at a cost of $2 million. It sounded
like a good idea, the editor stated, "that is, if your idea of out-
doorsing it is to run your recreational vehicle up to a unit, climb in
your boat, and roar around the lake, return, have dinner and a couple
of shots in your motor home and maybe watch a little TV before retiring.
" The editor concluded that, at one time, the few Alaskans who went
camping did so for the fun of it, and it rarely involved more than "a
sleeping bag, a tent or an evergreen bough lean-to, and a hatchet for
firewood." The value of the outdoors was that it was outdoors and,
by definition, very different from indoors. Trees and animals did
pretty much what they wanted to and did not share their homes with
permanent rock fireplaces, hiking trails, snowmachines, and motorized
campers. (60)
Bud Shultz, the general manager of the state's largest electrical
utility cooperative, Anchorage-based Chugach Electric Association, Inc.,
stated that the Devil Canyon project "just does not make economic sense."
The power from the project woul d be too expensive, Schultz asserted for,
in 1976, Chugach customers paid 24 mills for their power at retail
prices, and only 11 mi 11 s at who1esa1e pri ces. Devil Canyon power, on
the other hand, was estimated to cost 21.9 mills at wholesale prices--
and that was in 1975 dollars. By the time the project finally produced
any power, Schultz feared, the price probably would have tripled. The
general manager pointed out that Chugach had long-term commitments to
purchase cheap fuel, principaly gas, to run its generators. (61) What
Schultz did not recognize, however, was that the federal government
probably would prohibit the use of natural gas for power generation
altogether in the near future and allocate that valuable resource for
higher use.
On June 10, 1976, Senator Gravel finally introduced two measures--
one authorizing the construction of the Watana and Devil Canyon units of
the Upper Susitna Basin project and related transmission facilities
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together with implementation of the Hydroelectric Power Development Act
of 1976 to facilitate the construction of hydroelectric power projects
by the Corps of Engineers. (62)
The second measure sought to facilitate the senator's scheme to
have state power authorities finance the construction of hydroelectric
projects as fast as engi neeri ng capabil iti es demanded.
At the end of June the Corps of Engineers did not, as expected,
recommend the immediate authorization of the project. Instead, it
stated that feasibility studies justified funding for a fuller evalu-
ation in order to determine whether or not the investment of large sums
needed for development of the project were warranted. (63) There were
reactions to Gravel's financing proposal as well. Unofficially, the
Alaska Power Administration opposed his financing scheme. Although this
body favored the concept of nonfederal financing of power developments
wherever possible, the agency feared the senator's approach would
lead to exceptionally large federal monetary obligations because of the
language of the Gravel proposal. It believed that substantial federal
obligations should be controlled through a process of congressional
authorization on a project-by-project basis. (64)
Arguably, this negative assessment owed something to the fear that
its functions would be assumed by a state power authority. In formal
testimony before the Water Resources Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on Publ i c ~Jorks, Robert J. Cross, the admini strator of the Alas ka
Power Administration stated that his agency considered the development
of Devil Canyon entirely feasible. As for Gravel's financing scheme,
Cross pointed out that it was "obvious that the bill covers areas that
are far beyond the expertise and jurisdiction" of his agency and "would
involve substantial shifts of responsibility in federal water programs,
and that other regions of the U. S. would be affected.,,(65)
At the time Gravel had unveiled his financing scheme, a measure to
create the Alaska Power Authority was pending before the state legis-
lature. Introduced by legislators Jim Duncan and Red Swanson in response
to power needs in southeastern Alaska, the proposal was admirablY suited
to fulfill Gravel's conception of the state's role. After intensive
infighting between the "boomers" and controlled-grO\~th factions within
the Hammond administration, the Alaska Power Authority emerged. As a
public corporation within the Department of Commerce and Economic
Development, but with a separate and independent legal existence, the
new body is charged with responsibility to promote, develop, and advance
the prosperity and welfare of Alaskans by providing a means of con-
structing, acquiring, financing, and operating hydroelectric and fossil
fuel generating projects. The Alaska Power Authority is to use monies
from a revolving fund for funding feasibility studies, preconstruction
engineering, design, and construction of power projects. As such, the
authority was to provide low-cost monies to assist utilities in devel-
oping new generating capacities and also act as a wholesale power supplier.
One observer of power development in Alaska noted that there had
been real concern that the Alaska Power authority might evolve into an
uncontrollable force for development. For this reason, a delicate
system of checks and balances was written into the authorizing legis-
lation. The authority was to determine power needs, determine priorities,
and assist with its bonding authority or serve as a project developer
and marketing agent. Power development proposals were to be submitted
to the governor for review by affected state agencies. After review,
the chief executive is to forward the proposal to the legislature with
his recommendations. The Alaska Power Authority bonding authority would
have to be activated by a joint resolution of the legislature, subject
to the governor's veto. And since the Hammond administration prefers
the separation of the planning and construction functions of its public
works-related agencies, the Division of Energy and Power Development has
been established in the Department of Commerce and Economic Development
to complement the Alaska Power Authority. The Division of Energy and
Power Development is charged with formulating a power development plan
for the state, while the Alaska Power Authority has to perform its
functions in accordance with this plan.(65)
In September of 1975, the Devil Canyon project cleared its first
major legislative hurdle when formal studies of the project were approved
by the Senate Public Works Committee. The dam was part of a package of
projects approved. Funding authorizations, however, were delayed until
the start of the federal government's 1978 fiscal year beginning
October 1, 1977. (57) It soon became apparent, however, that the Water
Resources Development Act of 1975 could not be approved because the
conference committee determined that disparities between the House and
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Senate versions of the measure were too great to be resolved before
Congress adjourned. At the last minute, conference committee members
decided to give negotiations another try. They continued their efforts
until an acceptable bill was hammered out which both houses then accepted
and which President Carter signed. The legislation, besides including
funding for 149 public works projects in all 50 states, provided $25
million for the first phase of the Susitna project under Gravel's
financing scheme.(6B)
A month later, Senator Gravel urged state officials to order sake
of revenue bonds by the Alaska Power Authority to get the first phase of
the Devil Canyon project started in the summer of 1977. In case no
bonds were sold, Gravel pointed out, federal funds would not be available
until October 1,1977, again delaying the project. The senator suggested
the state immediately provide $100,000 to the Corps of Engineers to
enable it to prepare a plan of study, including firm data on the cost of
the project. The study then would provide the basis for the sale of
state bonds to fund an early construction start. (69)
By early 1977, the state had taken no steps to sell revenue bonds
and no money had been provided for the corps to prepare a plan of study.
At this point, the State Department of Natural Resources had entered the
picture by coordinating a cooperative study involving local, state, and
federal agencies. The purpose of this study was to collect information
for a future inventory in the Susitna area, and to serve as a tool for
planning and resource management by these agencies. The timing of the
cooperative study, however, served to muddy the waters. Studies can be,
and often are, used as substitutes for action.(75)
Contrary to Senator Gravel's expectations, the Senate-House Con-
ference Committee on the appropriations bill deleted the monies for
Susitna in July of 1977. All was not lost, however, because Senator
John Stennis (D., Miss.) received assurance from the House conferees to
hold early hearings on the merit of the Susitna proposal. Senator
Gravel once again expressed optimism and stated that he would "press
hard for an appropriation in the Supple mental (appropriation in the
fa 11) and expect that (hi s) efforts will meet wi th success." (70)
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Since July 1977, Alaskan newspapers have been relatively quiet
about the Susitna Project. Conservationists have continued to express
their concerns. In the winter of 1977, the Denali Citizen's Council
told Governor Hammond that the Susitna project was "scaled beyond the
wildest needs of the Anchorage area and Southcentral region" and would
"produce a tremendous glut of cheap power ... which will not only invite
but make practically mandatory the state's inducement of large industrial
electric power users to move into the Susitna region to accomplish a
rapid pay-back of this gargantuan federal pork barrel." The council
asserted that the estimated cost of the project amounted to $7 billion,
which made it safe to assume that "it will run at least twice that ..•
ever see a corps project in Alaska that didn't double its estimated
cost?" The council asked the governor if he intended "to provide the
Teamsters and all the other crooked unions in this state with another
big-boom chance to rip off the state and people of Alaska." If the
governor intended to follow this course, the council assured him he
"could hardly support a bigger mess than this $14 billion boondoggle."
The council stated that Alaska needed stabil ity and a chance to build a
better, not bigger society in Alaska. Last but not least, "the Susitna
hydroproject is far greater in size than conservationists ever consented
to when they pointed to Devil Canyon as a possible alternative to
Rampart. What they spoke of was a modest hydroproject that would flood
only several square miles aLmost in Devil Canyon. This gargantua would
flood over 82 square miles for 80 miles upriver!" The council urged the
governor to "keep our developments sma 11 and Alaskan. Show that devel-
opment can be in harmony with the environment--natural and human.,,(71)
Alaskan opponents of the project probably rejoice that the Susitna
project seems to be stalled for the moment. George Matz, the director
of the Fairbanks Environmental Center, probably expresses the concerns
of those opposed to Susitna best. Calling the project "a strange hybrid
between a dinosaur, octopus, and fox," he worri es that, if bui It, it
will dictate rather than respond to the future lifestyles that will pre-
dominate in Alaska. If completed on time in 1990, Susitna would provide
three times the amount of energy now used by the Anchorage and Fairbanks
load centers. The surplus power, /1atz asserts, would undoubtedly be
used to stimulate and subsidize industrial and population growth in both
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the Anchorage and Fairbanks metropolitan areas. This prospect is not
appeal i ng to the members of the Fa i rbanks Envi ronmenta 1 Center. (72)
Actually, total area electric power requirements in 1972 amounted
to about 2 billion kilowatt-hours, representing some 77 percent of the
estimated total statewide electric requirements for the year. Mid-range
growth estimates for the Alaska Power Survey indicated that these
requirements would increase to approximately 5 billion killowatt-hours
in 1980 and that this figure would double by 1990. According to esti-
mates, the full four-dam potential of the Susitna project, however,
would deliver only some 7 billion kilowatt-hours annually--a little over
70 percent of the estimated 1990 railbelt area power requirements. (73)
On the federal level in Washington, the Susitna project has not
surfaced again in Congress, busy with debating President Jimmy Carter's
energy proposals, among other issues. No doubt, the issue of hydro-
electric development in Alaska is part of a national contest between the
proponents of economic growth and those advocating "zero growth."
Groups like Friends of the Earth, the Sierra Club, and various other
environmental organizations together with their Alaskan affiliates
advocate a concept they call "voluntary simplicity." This calls for a
substantial lowering of the American standard of living. In energy
matters, they are followers of British physicist Amory B. Lovins who
rejects present federal policies which essentially represent an extrapo-
lation of the past and rely on rapid expansion of centralized high
technologies to increase supplies of energy, especially in the form of
electricity. A mammoth project like Susitna clearly belongs in this
category.
Alaska's Susitna project has become embroiled in a conflict between
traditional liberals committed to economic growth and material progress,
and the contemporary environmentalists who oppose unlimited growth and
remind us that we live in a world of scarce resources. Indeed, scarcity
is the modern planner's penance for sins committed by the traditional
liberals in their attempts to dominate nature. There are ideological
undertones in the environmental movement. In their rhetoric, environ-
mentalists remind mankind of its imminent doom and the sinfulness of his
profligate nature. But like the traditional liberals, environmentalists
often are intolerant and unwilling to permit the individual free choice.
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When the Susitna project emerges again, there undoubtedly will be
demands fora new environmental impact statement before permission is
given to advance the project to the planning stage. Environmentalists
are prepared to criticize such a statement as inadequate and incomplete.
They will point out that the energy demand projections assume a sub-
stantial growth of energy-intensive industries in the vicinity of
Anchorage which, they maintain, is purely speculative. Therefore, much
of the power produced will be superfluous. Furthermore, risks are high.
The Upper Susitna has a subarctic climate, and the Corps of Engineers
has never built a dam under those climatic conditions with the attendant
danger of substantial ice build-up. Finally, the area lies in a very
active seismic zone. Earthquakes of an intensity up to and exceeding
8.5 on the Richter scale are entirely possible. Could a dam be built to
withstand such forces? Perhaps, but only time will tell. (74)
~/hatever the course of the Susitna project, those who support and
those who oppose it will reflect on the history of the Rampart proposal.
It is clear that the advocacy of Rampart delayed Devil Canyon at a time
when its construction might have been pushed through against compara-
tively slight resistance. Advocates of Rampart who now favor Devil
Canyon might wish they had not committed themselves so singlemindedly
earlier. On the other hand, those who now oppose Devil Canyon may be
encouraged by the shelving of Rampart to believe that similar forces can
be mobil ized to stop the Susitna project. Of course, conditions are
different. In very important aspects, the two projects are not parallels.
Yet, as rallying points for sustained public pressure from various
interest groups, they share many similarities.
As has been shown, legislative action in Juneau and Washington, D.
C., made Gravel's financing scheme possible. The state legislature
passed the 1976 Alaska Power Authority Act, while the Water Resources
Development Act of 1976 authorized a new procedure for publiC, non-
federal financing of federally constructed hydroelectric projects. It
is also clear that the federal functions performed by the Alaska Power
Administration, the Corps of Engineers, and the Federal Power Commission
closely parallel the responsibility of the state's Alaska Power Authority
and Divis"ion of Energy and Power Development. Federal and state review
as well as an assessment of public opinion are assured through the
environmental impact statement process. The federal hydroelectric
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development process is extremely cumbersome, but it offers opportunities
for the consolidation of opposition and for a full debate of the issues.
Federal involvement also assures consideration of the national interest
and, of course, offers the advantage of financial subsidies.
The pertinent state agencies are presumably more responsive to
local needs, but, to the extent that developments are funded out of the
general fund rather than from power sales from projects, they are more
expensive. Undoubtedly, the federal agencies will slowly withdraw their
activities in hydroelectric planning and development from Alaska. This,
however, excludes the Federal Power Commission which will retain its
regulatory and licensing role.
Once the responsible state agencies have become fully operational,
electric utilities will increasingly turn to them for timely planning
and development aid. Once the state has assumed full responsibility for
power planning and development, where will this leave the various
interest groups?
Pressures for developing Alaska's resources are overwhelming at
times. The impact of strong dissenting opinions on .the state decision-
making process will focus attention on available alternatives and hope-
fully prevent col ossa1 blunders. But much wi 11 also depend on the
inclinations of the chief executive and the makeup of the state legis-
lature. In late 1977, one year before the election, the powerful Anchorage
DaiZy Times already has launched a campaign against Governor Hammond,
re9ularly attacking him as a "no-9rowther." The paper has powerful
allies in this attack in Teamster boss Jess Carr and former governor
Walter J. Hickel. Too often Governor Hammond instead of boasting of his
administration's careful approach to economic development, has gone on
the defensive and cited the economic growth fostered by his adminis-
tration.
In the final analysis, the Susitna project was not delayed by
opposition from the conservationists, but rather by the cumbersome and
protracted federal hydropower development process as well as the dis-
interest of various chief executives to the power needs of Alaska.
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CONCLUS IONS
By tradition, historians are reticent to conclude that certain
causative factors have produced clearly defined results or a specific
situation, Yet it does appear that the Rampart-Susitna hydroelectric
projects have been closely intertwined and that emphasis on the one has
affected the other. We have been dealing with a situation which has
emerged as the result of an assessment of certain priorities and strate-
gies, but not one in which a direction was determined with full antici-
pation of the results. It is obvious that the political process has a
bearing upon the authorization of hydroelectric projects in Alaska.
Advocates of a particular project or a particular means of solving a
hydroelectric need have not been tempted to present their position to
the public in such a way as to promote a clear debate on the most
effective course of action. Their failure to do this does not proceed
from an attempt to deceive or to mislead the public. Rather, they act
from their conviction that their position has to be represented as
strongly as possible. Essentially the Rampart proponents have argued
that their project represented the highest good, and in making this
argument they convinced themselves that their project represented the
only feasible possibility. Environmentalists, on the other hand, have
concentrated their efforts on showing the unsoundness of Rampart, and,
with the help of adverse reports from federal agencies, could do so
effectively. Their advocacy of alternate hydroelectric or other power
alternatives has been tentatively expressed, and had been hardly strong
enough to open a general public consideration. Of course, it is not the
policy of environmental groups to foster any hydroelectric projects.
Their favoring the Susitna project has been understood, where it has
been appreciated at all, as merely a diversionary tactic. What has been
lacking has been the leadership of other individuals or organizations
free from commitments to the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Recla-
mation, the Gruening group, or the conservationists, who might have
presented the issues on a less partisan level. The editorial efforts
which have been made by a couple of newspapers have not been enough to
keep the Susitna project alive in the face of the aggressive Rampart
advocacy. We are not insisting that the Susitna project was then or is
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now the best solution to Alaska's power requirements, but only pointing
out that a significant consideration of other alternatives could not
have occurred within the adversary framework that has developed.
Who should have tried to extend the power debate? Ultimately, that
responsibility should have been assumed by the elected officials of the
state. For good reasons, these officials had to be concerned with
tactics and advocacy. An all-out effort to throw open a full discussion
of the problem jeopardized Gruening's Rampart position and the commit-
ment which the state officials sincerely believed necessary. Thus they
were drawn into the "all or nothing" approach which was the result, if
not the intention, of the unfortunate determination of the Gruening-led
Rampart forces. We must reiterate that neither corruption nor misrepre-
sentation was involved. Quite simply, the situation has evolved as it
has due to a choice of strategy in reaching a desired political conclusion.
We need not say that the wrong decisions were made, but we can see that
the decisions made determined the present status of the Susitna project.
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EKLUTNA
In the 1930s Alaskan communities generated power from coal or oil
and sometimes used small hydroelectric plants. One such installation
had been built by private interests in 1929 at the mouth of Eklutna Lake
which empties into Eklutna Creek. The latter enters Knik Arm from the
Chugach Mountains some twenty-four miles northeast of Anchorage. The
creek descends through a steep-sided, troughlike, glaciated valley about
twenty-seven miles long. Rugged peaks up to 8,200 feet in elevation
rise sharply above short valleys which are tributary to the creek.
Eklutna Lake, seven miles long and one mile wide, located at an elevation
of 868 feet, is the principal feature of the basin. It lies in a valley
headed by a glacier and a snowfield. The lake overflowed through
Eklutna Creek below the rock dam which was raised to provide a water
supply for the small power plant near Eklutna Village, about eight miles
downstream.
Reports had it that the initial structure was not overly successful
because when the water level rose four to five feet above the natural
barrier, the slightest leak allowed the water to escape. In order to
remedy the situation, operators drove wood piles across the mouth of the
overflow channel to permit the storage of water to a depth of three to
four feet above the natural lake level.
In the fall of 1934, contractors built an earth- and rock-filled
structure which incorporated portions of the original dam. It provided
a more stable water supply to assure dependable generation of electricity.
Finally, in 1943 the city of Anchorage purchased the operation from the
private owner. (1)
Due to the increased demand created by World War II, Anchorage
found it advisable to purchase a 600- and a 350-kilowatt generator from
the Surplus Property Office for a price of $45,000. When this proved
inadequate, the city sought to obtain a power barge, destroyer, or some
other portable plant which might suffice until Congress approved a
requested $7-million improvement bond issue from which $1.5 million was
to be used for a new 5,OOO-kilowatt capacity power plant. (2)
This patchwork action kept Anchorage supplied with power, but the
needs increased. The Corps of Engineers was powerless to expand Anchorage
power-generating facilities located at Eklutna. The River and Harbor
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Act of March 2, 1945, had provided for preliminary examinations and
surveys of Cook Inlet to improve navigation, develop hydroelectric
power, and to provide harbor facilities. A spokesman for the Corps of
Engineers advised Alaska's delegate to Congress, E. L. "Bob" Bartlett,
to introduce legislation which would authorize the construction of an
Eklutna plant.(3)
After the war, Congress made available $150,000 for the investi-
gation of the territory's power resources. An Alaska Investigations
Office was quickly established and, under the able leadership of Joseph
M. Morgan and his colleagues, an exhaustive investigation of Eklutna and
other potential hydroelectric sites was made. Investigations determined
that, as of the time of the study, the utility systems serving the
Anchorage area and the Matanuska Valley had a production capacity of
only 8,625 kilowatts--far short of the actual needs. Total Alaskan
generating capacity from private plants amounted to 35,931 kilowatts and
that of public plants to only 19,440 kilowatts for a grand territorial
total of 55,371 kilowatts. The power production was woefully inadequate
for Alaskan needs. On the floor of the House, delegate Bartlett asserted
that federal policy had long and actively supported the development of
the water resources of the west, while not "a thin dime" had been put
into Alaskan water power development. The delegate argued that a "start
should be made now" because plentiful power was a prime necessity for "a
self-sufficient economy," which, in turn, "was essential for national
defense.,,(4)
The ways of Congress, however, are elaborate and time consuming.
Not until the fall of 1948 did the Department of the Interior prepare a
measure which would allow the Secretary of the Interior "to construct,
operate, and maintain hydroelectric power projects in Alaska." All
executive departments commented favorably on the proposal, except the
most important one--the Bureau of the Budget--which maintained an icy
silence. Without the latter's approval, any measure was doomed but
delegate Bartlett nevertheless submitted one which, predictably, died
with the 80th Congress.
The new Congress, convening in 1949, offered a fresh start. By
June of that year, the full House Public Lands Committee favorably
reported a bill which called for the immediate construction of the
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Eklutna project at a cost of $21,500,000. By the end of the month,
the Bureau of the Budget had given its blessing with the reservation
that the Federal Reclamation laws were not to be extended to the
territory, nor were recreational facilities to be developed along with
the project. (5)
The proposed Eklutna facility was to consist of a low dam which
would raise the level of the lake by two feet, a tunnel four and one-
half miles in length leading from the lake through the mountain to the
north, a penstock of 1,250 feet, and a 30,000-kilowatt capacity power
plant at the base of the mountain. Transmission lines would carry the
electricity to the Matanuska Valley and to Anchorage. The proposed
installation would save millions of dollars for the Matanuska Valley,
Anchorage, the armed forces and various federal agencies over the 50-
year payment period. (6)
Thanks to the prodding of Bartlett, the federal government had
provided the first comprehensive and coordinated plant to meet the power
requirements of the Anchorage region. Yet another year had passed
without action, and in January of 1950, an editorial in the Anchorage
DaiZy Times suggested that the Eklutna project had become entangled in
the perpetual jurisdictional feud between the Bureau of Reclamation and
the Army Corps of Engineers. The editor proposed that Eklutna be
sponsored as a municipal improvement under the Alaska Public Works
Act and that the entire matter be taken out of Washington hands and put
into those of the General Service Agency where construction would begin
promptly. (7)
Before the suggestion could be considered seriously, the Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs favorably reported on the
Eklutna project on February 20, 1950. The project was to be independent
of the general Bureau of Reclamation program, although was to be built
by it. (8)
The Eklutna measure came before the full Senate on June 8, 1950,
but was passed over due to the objection of Senator John L. McClennan
(D., Arkansas). Once again Alaska lost. McClellan had recently been
president of the National Rivers and Harbors Congress, an unofficial
body closely affiliated with the Corps of Engineers, which did not want
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the Bureau of Reclamation building dams. Alaskans did not care who
built the installation--the Bureau of Reclamation or the Corps of
Engineers--as long as it was built. But, of course, bureaucratic
rivalry existed and had the tendency to thwart development. Immediately
after the bill was passed over, Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney (D., Wyoming)
told Bartlett that only the president, alerted by the Secretary of the
Interior, could now save the measure. Secretary of the Interior Oscar
Chapman complied with Bartlett's plea for help and wrote Senator McClellan
that the need for the Ek1utna project was critical. In 1947 power
supply shortages had forced Anchorage to lease the stern half of a
wrecked Liberty ship containing a diesel power plant, to supplement
power supplies. Even then, though, brownouts were frequent. Ek1utna
was desperately needed. (9) A few days later Bartlett talked to Senator
McClellan and received the latter's assurances that he did not want to
be an "obstructionist" and indicated that he would have no further
objections to the measure. Subsequently, the bill passed the Senate,
went to the House which passed it with the Senate amendments asking for
an appropriation of $20,365,400, and the president signed the measure
into law on July 31,·1950. (10)
Authorization had been granted--now an appropriation had to be
requested--and the Department of the Interior asked for $1.1 million to
start construction and appointed Byron G. Felkner construction engineer.
By September 22, the Bureau of Reclamation officially announced that
initial plans and specifications were being expedited together with the
$1.1 million appropriation in order to issue construction bids as soon
as possible. (11)
By February of 1951, the Alaska District Office of the Bureau of
Reclamation reported that the drilling contractor had employed two
shifts of workers seven days a week. In the planning stage were twelve
permanent homes for the employees at the power plant site as well as two
ten-car garages, a warehouse, waterworks, roads, general utilities, and
a 115,000-volt transmission line to Palmer. By September, Palmer Con-
structors of Omaha, Nebraska, a three-firm organization including Peter
Kiewit and Sons, Coker Construction Co., and Morrison-Knudsen Co. had won
the bid for bUilding the four-mile long, nine-foot diameter transmountain
water diversion tunnel and other facilities at Eklutna for $17,343,865.
The bid called for the completion of the project within 1,050 days. (12)
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It soon became apparent, however, that the bureau had underestimated
the cost of the Ek1utna project. A variety of factors, such as the
defense construction program in Alaska linked to the Korean War, inflation,
and structural engineering modifications had increased the costs. (13)
H. F. McPahi1, the assistant commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation,
blamed his organization's inexperience with Alaskan construction con-
ditions for the cost overrun. Initially, the Bureau of Reclamation had
estimated that it would cost 1.4 times more to build dams in Alaska than
in the continental United States. Now, however, McPahi1 confessed the
differential turned out to be nearer to 2.3 times oVer construction
costs in the continental United States. Joseph Morgan, the Bureau of
Reclamation chief in Alaska, questioned McPahil's figures. When Ek1utna
was first designed in 1948, construction had been divided into two
phases, the second of which was to provide additional generating capacity.
The first phase was to have cost the $20,365,000 which Congress authorized
in 1950. The Korean War, however, interfered, and resulted in stepped-
up defense activiti es, and, as a result, mil itary as well as civil ian
power requirements had soared. Federal agencies located in Anchorage had
informed the Bureau of Development that the second phase was essential
and the full $35,000,000 was needed. (14)
Delegate Bartlett, as well as other members of Congress, was not
pleased with the performance of the Bureau of Reclamation. Bartlett
complained that the bureau had told the House of Representatives that
the job would cost $20,365,400 and now, barelY two years later, they
discovered that the actual cost would be $33,000,000. Bartlett was
convinced that ... "the bureau knew darned well in '50 the job would cost
more but merely wanted to get its head under the tent. I regard this as
unexcusable." Members of the House Interior Committee considering the
request for increased funding were similarly upset. Typical were
Representative Fred L. Crawford (R., Michigan) who angrily remarked that
"I would have no hesitation to kill this project dead if only to demon-
strate to the people what silly asses we are," and Representative
Wesley A. D'Ewart (R., Montana) who thought that Congress had made a
mistake initially in authorizing the project. (15) Certainly, abandon-
ment would have been an extremely effective demonstration of Congressional
displeasure, but would have cost $11,729,000, the sum already expended,
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as G. W. Lineweaver, the acting Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation
pointed out. If postponed for six years, the loss to the American
taxpayer would amount to $6,367,000 in addition to some $50,000 for
annual maintenance of the property and construction facilities. (16)
Bartlett asked for additional monies and naturally was perturbed
that several House committee members advocated abandonment. On April 30,
May 14 and 15, and June 2, 1952, the House Subcommittee on Irrigation
and Reclamation held formal hearings on Bartlett's measure to enlarge
the authorization for Eklutna in an amount "not to exceed $35,000,000."
The subcommittee, however, took no action, and instead asked the U. S.
Attorney General and the General Accounting Office to determine whether
or not the bureau, which protested its innocence, had violated any laws
in granting contracts in excess of the amount Congress had authorized
and the effect, if any, on the contracts already awarded. In due time,
the former found no basis for any criminal action, while the latter
decided that any contracts which exceeded the authorization were in
violation of Section 3732, Revised Statutes, and were, therefore, null
and void. The Bureau of Reclamation quickly complied with the ruling of
the comptroller general and reduced the tunnel contract with Palmer con-
structors by some $3,574,355 and the power plant contract with Rue
Contracting CompanY in the amount of $690,212--a total reduction of
$4,264,567 which brought the face value of the awarded contracts to
$19,358,131, approximately $1,000,000 less than Congress had authorized. (17)
In the meantime, however, things seemed to be looking a bit brighter
on the Senate side because most members simply had not given much
thought to it. After talking with Senator Carl Hayden (D., Arizona),
Bartlett asked enthusiastic Alaskan supporters of the project not to
send telegrams boosting the project to the Senate because it might raise
questions where none had existed before. (18)
Actually, the Eklutna project was getting caught in rivalries
between the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers, and
perhaps more importantly, in a battle waged by Congress to recapture
control of spending from the executive agencies. For years Congress had
been trying to regain spending control by putting a dollar ceiling
on projects rather than approving open-ended authorizations. In 1952
the House had almost succeeded in putting a ceiling on military ex-
penditures. Agencies often had returned to Congress asking for more
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money than initially authorized. Whenever Congress had balked at such
requests, agency spokesmen had always persuasively shown that it was
more economical to ante up more money finishing anyone project than
abandoning it. As the record shows, Congress has always opted for
additional funds. (19)
Early in December of 1952, Bartlett asked Representative A. L.
Miller (R., Nebraska), the man who most likely was to chair the important
Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation, for help on the Eklutna
project. Early action was important for fiscal reasons, Bartlett
pointed out, because of provisions in the present power plant and tunnel
contracts. If not acted on by June 1, 1953, at the latest, the govern-
ment would be unable to hold the contractors to the original bid prices.
And on January 31, 1953, the delegate again introduced a measure to
increase the authorization up to a ceiling of $35,000,000. (20)
At the same time, the Bureau of Reclamation informed Bartlett that a
total of 124 contracts had been awarded with a face value of approximately
$19,890,000. The construction of the tunnel and alterations to the
existing dam were 34 percent complete, the power plant 8 percent, the
Eklutna-Anchorage 115-kv transmission line 65 percent, while the Eklutna-
Palmer 115-kv transmission line had been completed. If all went according
to projections, Eklutna was to be finished by the end of 1954, while the
first 15,000 kilowatt generating unit was to go on line in April of
1954, and the second and final one in August of that year. (21)
In early February, Bartlett, while talking to a member of the
Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation, discovered to his chagrin
that Bureau of Reclamation personnel had submitted the latest cost
estimate on Eklutna in the amount of $35,300,000, some $300,000 more
than he had asked for in his recently submitted bill. He angrily told
the bureau that their failure to advise him of that latest change left
him, as the author of the bill, in a most uncomfortable position. Any
bill dealing with Eklutna, he warned, will encounter much opposition.
"To leave the author of the legislation in complete ignorance as to most
recent developments is a somewhat novel approach to a final and satis-
factory solution." Fred G. Aandahl, the Assistant Secretary for Water
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and Power Development, tried to justify these latest increases. Water
conditions encountered in excavating the tunnel had necessitated work
shutdown in November of 1952. Engineers now thought it cheaper to dig a
channel into the tunnel floor than to pump the water, thereby increasing
the cost by $1,500,000. (22)
At the end of March, Bartlett doubted that his Eklutna measure
would be approved by the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee.
On March 24, 1953, hearings had been held before the Territories Sub-
committee. Subsequently, the committee went into executi ve sess i on.
Had a vote been taken then and there, the measure would have been
postponed indefinitely. Instead, however, the committee decided to hold
additional hearings. The delegate surmised that Eklutna had been
selected as the "guinea pig" upon which long-building animosities within
Congress against the Bureau of Reclamation has been concentrated. (23)
On April 2, the House Interior Subcommittee debated the Bartlett
bill and made a number of recommendations--among them, that the total
cost of the project be limited to $30,000,000; that annual operation and
maintenance expenditures be restricted to $120,000; that electricity be
sold at no less than 11.5 mills; and that the Department of the Interior
negotiate with the city of Anchorage for the purchase of existing hydro-
electric facilities and water rights at no more than original costs
minus a reasonable depreciation. Until these stipulations had been
met, and the Department of the Interior had negotiated with Anchorage,
the full House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs would not take
up the matter. (24)
There the matter stood until the new undersecretary of the Department
of Interior, Ralph A. Tudor, had found" the time to familiarize himself
with the Eklutna project. By the beginning of June, Tudor reported that
the previous administration had been lax in that it had permitted a
number of mistakes to be made, among them a serious underestimation of
construction costs; the awarding of contracts in excess of total Congressional
authorization; and the initiation of construction without a firm agree-
ment with the city of Anchorage for water rights, so essential to operate
the project. All was well, however, because the project could be com-
pleted for $33,333,000. Better yet, if energy were sold at approximately
11 mill per kilowatt hour hour the cost of the project would be amortized
5'i
within a fifty-year period. Tudor, therefore, recommended that Congress
increase the authorization to $33,000,000 and appropriate $8,250,000 for
fiscal year 1954. Bartlett, with a less modest estimate, in the mean-
time lobbied the Senate to include $12,791,000 in the 1954 Department of
the Interior appropriation bill for the continuation of the Ek1utna
project. (25)
After more debate and the adoption of a number of amendments, among
them a cost ceiling of $33,000,000 plus "such sums as may be necessary
for the operation and maintenance of the project," the full House passed
the Bartlett measure on July 30, 1953. Bartlett commended Congress for
"acting wisely in lifting the authorization for the original Eklutna
power bill." The delegate admitted that, regrettably, the project now
costs $13,000,000 more than was originally anticipated. Despite this,
however, Congress had invested wisely because the monies would be paid
back within fifty years with interest. Futhermore, only the furnishing
of cheap power would make Alaska's abundant resources available to the
nation. (26)
The next hurdle to be overcome was the Senate. That body could
either pass its own version, in which case the differences would have to
be ironed out, or it could adopt the House version and pass it. In the
end, the Department of the Interior appropriation bill contained a sum
of $7,750,000 for the continuation of the project. (27)
At the municipal election on October 6, 1953, Anchorage voters
approved an agreement between the city and the Department of the Interior.
It provided that, once power went on line at Eklutna, Anchorage was to
transfer its water rights at Eklutna to the department. In return,
Anchorage was to receive some 16,000,000 kilowatts of firm power from
Ek1utna with monthly credits on the city's electric bill to be given
until October 12, 1978, the date on which the license from the Federal
Power Commission expired. (28)
Eklutna power for Anchorage had become a reality when the first
15,000-kilowatt unit went on line in January of 1955 and the second in
March of the same year. Furthermore, the total project had cost $30,521,183,
approximately $2,500,000 less than the amount authorized.
56
It had taken years to realize the Eklutna project, and its sup-
porters felt that it should have been accomplished in a more timely
manner. Finally, however, Anchorage received the electrical power it so
urgently needed. From the perspective of the 1970s, it appears that the
project had been completed with wonderful speed.
By the late 1950s, it became clear that, with the rapid growth of
the Anchorage metropolitan area, power demand far outstripped the
available generating capacity. City officials persuaded Senator Bartlett
to introduce a bill which enabled the Bureau of Reclamation to accept
from Anchorage whatever monies were necessary to raise the dam at Eklutna
in order to convert some 20,000,000 kilowatt hour annual dump power to
firm power. Anchorage would be allowed to purchase power at a discount
rate for fifty years in return for its investment. At hearings held in
May of 1960, the small, rural electric cooperative associations in
southcentral Alaska opposed the Bartlett measure because it allowed
Anchorage to purchase extra power at a discount rate at the expense of
other consumers of Eklutna power. The Barlett bill subsequently died. (29)
On March 27, 1964, at 5:36 p.m. an earthquake, registering 8.5 on
the Richter Scale, shook southcentral Alaska and devastated several
communities. Eklutna suffered much damage to its power plant and appur-
tenant works. As soon as possible after the earthquake, the 8ureau of
Reclamation performed temporary repairs to restore the power plant and
pressure tunnel to normal operations and insure an adequate supply of
water.
On September 16, 1964, Senator Bartlett submitted a measure on
behalf of Senator Gruening and himself which provided that any repair
money spent on Eklutna would not be reimbursable from its revenues. The
Senator reintroduced the measure in 1965, and the Department of the
Interior favorablY reported on it in April of 1966. The Bureau of
Reclamation had since been forced to construct a new dam because repairs
to the. old one proved to be too expensive, and, for an additional
$121,000 above repair costs, it had built the new dam. Bartlett asked
that the $121,000 be reimbursable while the $2,870,000 estimated repair
costs be absorbed by the federal government. Bartlett's measure was
signed into law on September 26, 1968, saving Eklutna power customers
$2,805,437. (30)
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